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MISCONSTRUING NOTICE IN EEOC
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSING
& CONCILIATION
Angela D. Morrison*
INTRODUCTION
Federal courts have misconstrued notice in the US Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC” or “Commission”) administrative
processing and conciliation of charges of discrimination. By requiring that the
notice given to employers during the Commission’s processing of a claim be
equivalent to that of notice in civil litigation, courts have conflated the purpose
of notice in the former with the latter. Some of this conflation may be a conse-
quence of the Supreme Court’s tightening of pleading standards, class certifica-
tion requirements, and other procedural requirements, which are primarily
focused on providing adequate notice to a defendant regarding the scope of the
plaintiffs’ claims.
In the fifty years since Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the procedural landscape for plaintiffs asserting claims under the Act
has changed dramatically. A series of decisions by the courts in the 1980s and
early 1990s meant that plaintiffs increasingly failed to reach the trial stage of
their employment discrimination suits because courts decided their cases using
“procedural devices.”1 In a series of more recent decisions, the Court has lim-
ited the ability of plaintiffs, particularly those making class allegations, to move
beyond the pleading stage.2 In the wake of these decisions, Defendant employ-
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law. Thanks to Ann
McGinley and Ruben Garcia for organizing the colloquium that led to this issue. Thanks also
to the editors of the Nevada Law Journal, especially Brittany Llewellyn and Nicole Scott for
their efforts on this essay. All errors are mine alone.
1 Phyllis Tropper Baumann et al., Substance in the Shadow of Procedure: The Integration of
Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. REV. 211, 220 (1992). See
generally Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use
of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203 (1993) (discussing
the impact of stricter summary judgment standards on employment discrimination cases).
2 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), will have on employment discrimination
suits because plaintiffs now will be held to a plausible pleading standard), and Charles A.
Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613,
1618 (2011) (analyzing impact that the decisions in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007); Suzette M. Malveaux, Clearing Civil Procedural Hurdles in the Quest for Jus-
tice, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 621, 621–22 (2011) (discussing how the Supreme Court’s recent
decisions regarding procedural requirements for pleading and class certification, and the
effect of mandatory arbitration create almost “insurmountable” procedural hurdles for plain-
tiffs in civil rights and consumer actions). See also Angela D. Morrison, Duke-ing Out Pat-
tern or Practice After Wal-Mart: The EEOC as Fist, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 87, 89 nn.2–3
(2013) (summarizing some of the literature regarding the negative impact Wal-Mart Stores,
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ers have increasingly used a litigation tactic that centers on the sufficiency of
the notice the EEOC provided them during the EEOC’s pre-suit administrative
processing of charges of discrimination.3 In considering the employers’ argu-
ments, courts have assumed that conciliation and other steps in the EEOC’s
multi-step administrative process serve the same purposes of well-pleaded
complaints and discovery in civil litigation and, therefore, require an attendant
level of notice to the employer during the administrative processing.
When courts misconstrue notice in administrative proceedings, they
impermissibly enlarge the due process rights of defendants in ways that under-
mine the effective enforcement of Title VII. Part I of this essay gives an over-
view of the EEOC’s litigation authority and its administrative processing duties
under Title VII. In Part II, the essay describes decisions in which courts have
conflated notice in the EEOC’s administrative processing of the charge with
notice in civil litigation. Part III of the essay discusses the purposes of notice in
civil litigation, and contrasts those purposes with the purposes of notice in the
EEOC’s administrative processing. Importantly, a civil action under Title VII
results in a trial and formal finding of liability while administrative processing
results in an opportunity to voluntarily comply with Title VII. Finally, Part IV
highlights the harm caused when courts import the principles underlying notice
in the litigation stage of an employment discrimination suit to their review of
the EEOC’s administrative processing. By not acknowledging the very differ-
ent rights at stake in the two proceedings, courts have failed to take into
account basic principles governing due process and erroneously have required
higher levels of notice for employers at the expense of Title VII enforcement.
I. THE EEOC’S AUTHORITY & CHARGE HANDLING OBLIGATIONS UNDER
TITLE VII
Through the Civil Rights Act of 1964,4 Congress created the EEOC to
receive, investigate, and attempt to resolve through voluntary compliance
charges of employment discrimination alleged under Title VII of the Act.5
However, the Act granted no independent authority to the EEOC to file suit
against employers whom the EEOC found had engaged in unlawful discrimina-
tion.6 Rather, the United States Attorney General through the Department of
Justice had authority pursuant to Title VII, section 707, to bring suit against
Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011), is expected to have on the ability of private litigants to
bring pattern or practice claims under Title VII); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobil-
ity LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 708–09 (2012)
(noting the negative impact the Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131
S.Ct. 1740 (2011), will have on plaintiffs’ ability to bring employment discrimination law-
suits where the employees have signed a binding arbitration clause).
3 Littler, a national law firm representing employers in employment law and labor disputes,
in its annual report on EEOC litigation highlighted employer challenges to the EEOC’s con-
ciliation as a means to obtain a dismissal of an EEOC suit. LITTLER, ANNUAL REPORT ON
EEOC DEVELOPMENTS: FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 44–45 (2014), available at http://www.littler
.com/files/press/pdf/Annual%20Report%20on%20EEOC%20Developments%20-%20FY%2
02013.pdf.
4 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
5 Id. at § 706(a).
6 See id. at § 706(e).
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employers.7 As a result, conciliation and other “informal methods of confer-
ence . . . and persuasion”8 were the only means by which the EEOC could
redress employment discrimination under the Act.
In 1972, Congress amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964, supplementing
the EEOC’s administrative processing authority with independent litigation
authority.9 As amended, Title VII now permitted the EEOC to bring suit in its
own name, in federal district court, asserting either that an employer had
engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination or that an employer had dis-
criminated against an individual employee or a group of employees.10 The
EEOC still was required to comply with the administrative processing proce-
dures in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) prior to bringing suit.11 Nonetheless, “[t]he
key to the whole legislation [was] the enforcement powers granted to the Com-
mission, the ability to go into the Federal district courts to enforce compliance
with the act.”12
Congress again amended Title VII through the Civil Rights Act of 1991.13
The Act expanded the remedies available to victims of employment discrimina-
tion to include not only injunctive and equitable relief, but also compensatory
and punitive damages.14 Importantly, the Act’s definition of “complaining
party” included the EEOC, allowing the EEOC to seek punitive and compensa-
tory damages under the statute.15
7 Id. at § 707(a).
8 Id. at § 706(a).
9 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 4–5, 86 Stat. 103,
104–07 (1972).
10 Id.
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-6(e) (2012).
12 118 CONG. REC. 7569 (Mar. 8, 1972) (remarks of Sen. Dent).
13 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071. The Act provides
for recovery by complaining individuals for intentional discrimination:
In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 or 2000e-16] against a respondent who engaged in unlawful inten-
tional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate
impact) prohibited under section 703, 704, or 717 of the Act [42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3,
or 2000e-16], and provided that the complaining party cannot recover under section 1981 of this
title, the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in sub-
section (b) of this section, in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1).
14 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1). Compensatory damages include “future pecuniary losses, emo-
tional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other
nonpecuniary losses.” Id. § 1981(b)(3).
15 Id. § 1981(d)(1). The statute defines the complaining party in pertinent part as the
following:
The term “complaining party” means—
(A) in the case of a person seeking to bring an action under subsection (a)(1) of this section, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Attorney General, or a person who may bring
an action or proceeding under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . .
Id. This subsection was part of a technical amendment requested by the EEOC chairman
Evan J. Kemp to clarify the EEOC’s ability to seek punitive and compensatory damages. 137
CONG. REC. 28,860–61 (Oct. 29, 1991). Mr. Kemp argued that the change was needed
because without it, the EEOC’s enforcement abilities would be undermined:
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Before the EEOC can bring suit in federal court, it must meet conditions
precedent through its multi-step administrative processing.16 These include
receipt of an underlying charge and notice of the charge to the employer, an
investigation, a reasonable cause determination, and an attempt to conciliate.17
A charge is “a jurisdictional springboard” from which the EEOC begins its
investigation of an employer’s alleged violation of Title VII.18 The charge may
be filed “by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved, or by a member
of the Commission.”19 The Act requires that charges “be in writing under oath
or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such form as the
Commission requires.”20 The purpose of the oath or affirmation is “to provide
some degree of insurance [for employers] against catchpenny claims of dis-
gruntled, but not necessarily aggrieved, employees.”21 The information
required in the charge is set forth in the regulations.22 Once the charge is veri-
fied, the EEOC must notify the employer about the charge within ten days.23
It would undermine the Commission’s ability to enforce Title VII . . . if private parties, but not
the EEOC, are allowed to seek the enhanced remedies. Indeed, if that were the case the Commis-
sion might have a duty to refer all cases of intentional discrimination to private attorneys
because, by filing suit, the Commission would dramatically reduce the relief available to the
victims. This would be true especially in the case of sexual harassment claims; because there is
often no back pay at stake in those cases, the only monetary remedy would be compensatory and
punitive damages.
Id. at 28,861.
16 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012) (charges, filing, allegations, notice to respondent,
contents of notice, investigation by the EEOC, determination of reasonable cause, concilia-
tion); Id. § 2000e-8 (EEOC investigative authority); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21 (2013) (reasonable
cause determination: procedure and authority).
17 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (f).
18 EEOC v. Gen. Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 1976) (“The charge merely provides
the EEOC with ‘a jurisdictional springboard to investigate whether the employer is engaged
in any discriminatory practices.’ ”) (quoting EEOC v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 511 F.2d
453, 455 (5th Cir. 1975)).
19 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
20 Id.
21 Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 115 (2002).
22 EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 67 (1984) (affirming that the statute delegates the
determination of the form and contents of a charge of discrimination to the EEOC). The
current regulations require that the following content be included in a charge of
discrimination:
(1) The full name, address and telephone number of the person making the charge . . . ;
(2) The full name and address of the person against whom the charge is made, if known (herein-
after referred to as the respondent);
(3) A clear and concise statement of the facts, including pertinent dates, constituting the alleged
unlawful employment practices . . . ;
(4) If known, the approximate number of employees of the respondent employer or the approxi-
mate number of members of the respondent labor organization, as the case may be; and
(5) A statement disclosing whether proceedings involving the alleged unlawful employment
practice have been commenced before a State or local agency charged with the enforcement of
fair employment practice laws and, if so, the date of such commencement and the name of the
agency.
29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a) (2013).
23 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b):
Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved, or by a member
of the Commission, alleging that an employer . . . has engaged in an unlawful employment
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The notice should state the basis of the charge “including the date, place and
circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice.”24
After serving notice of the charge to the employer, the EEOC must con-
duct an investigation into the charge.25 Under the statute, the EEOC has broad
investigative powers and the EEOC “shall at all reasonable times have access to
. . . any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against that
relates to unlawful employment practices covered by [Title VII] and is relevant
to the charge under investigation.”26 The EEOC’s investigation may consist of
interviewing the charging party(ies) and other witnesses, obtaining a position
statement from the employer, on-site inspections, and requests for information
and production of other evidence.27 Title VII also authorizes the EEOC to issue
administrative subpoenas as part of its investigation and the EEOC can seek
enforcement of its subpoenas in federal court.28 The investigation is linked to
the charge of discrimination because the evidence the EEOC seeks must be
“relevant” to the charge.29 The Court has stated that the relevance limitation,
however, “is not especially constraining.”30 Courts have upheld the EEOC’s
broad investigatory powers because “it is crucial that the Commission’s ability
to investigate charges of systemic discrimination not be impaired.”31
Accordingly, once the EEOC commences its investigation, “if the investi-
gation turns up additional violations the Commission can add them to its
suit.”32 The EEOC may investigate whether an employer discriminated against
a class of employees, even if the investigation was initiated by a charge of
individual discrimination.33 After an investigation has started, the investigation
practice, the Commission shall serve a notice of the charge (including the date, place and circum-
stances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) on such employer . . . within ten days.
24 Id.
25 Id. (“Whenever a charge is filed . . . the Commission . . . shall make an investigation
thereof.”).
26 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a); Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 63.
27 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (granting the EEOC the same investigative authority as that granted
to the NLRB under 29 U.S.C. § 161); The Charge Handling Process, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/process.cfm (last visited Apr. 8,
2014) [hereinafter Charge Handling Process].
28 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (granting the EEOC the same administrative subpoena power in
conducting its investigations as that granted to the NLRB pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 161). The
regulations also set forth the categories of evidence for which the EEOC has subpoena
power: “(1) The attendance and testimony of witnesses; (2) The production of evidence
including, but not limited to, books, records, correspondence, or documents, in the posses-
sion or under the control of the person subpoenaed; and (3) Access to evidence for the
purposes of examination and the right to copy.” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.16 (2013).
29 Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 68 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8). See also Charge Handling
Process, supra note 27.
30 Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 68.
31 Id. at 69.
32 EEOC v. Caterpillar, Inc., 409 F.3d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 2005); see also EEOC v. Hearst
Corp., 553 F.2d 579, 580 (9th Cir. 1977); EEOC v. Gen. Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 365 (4th
Cir. 1976); EEOC v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 511 F.2d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 1975).
33 EEOC v. Konica Minolta Bus. Solutions U.S.A., Inc., 639 F.3d 366, 369 (7th Cir. 2011).
When the EEOC investigates a charge of race discrimination for purposes of Title VII, it is
authorized to consider whether the overall conditions in a workplace support the complaining
employee’s allegations. Racial discrimination is “by definition class discrimination,” and infor-
mation concerning whether an employer discriminated against other members of the same class
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can continue regardless of whether the charging party has settled with the
employer and requested to withdraw the charge of discrimination.34
And, although investigation is one of the conditions precedents to subse-
quent EEOC litigation, an inadequate investigation does not result in dismissal
of the EEOC’s case.35 Rather, courts reviewing the investigation merely deter-
mine whether the EEOC failed to investigate the charge.36 If the EEOC finds
“reasonable cause to believe the charge is true,” it issues a letter of determina-
tion to the employer and charging party.37 At that point, “the Commission shall
endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by infor-
mal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.”38 Thus, in the letter
of determination, the EEOC invites the employer to resolve the allegations
through conciliation.39 The process is confidential40 and the EEOC will seek
“to obtain agreement that the [employer] will eliminate the unlawful employ-
ment practice and provide appropriate affirmative relief.”41 If the conciliation
is successful, the terms of the conciliation agreement are reduced to writing and
the EEOC, the employer, and the charging party sign the agreement.42 The
EEOC will notify the employer in writing if the EEOC is “unable to secure
from the [employer] a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission”
and the EEOC may then bring a lawsuit.43
for the purposes of hiring or job classification may cast light on whether an individual person
suffered discrimination.
Id. (citing EEOC v. United Air Lines, Inc. 287 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2002)). See also
EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., 587 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding erroneous a district
court’s refusal to enforce EEOC administrative subpoena seeking nationwide information).
34 See, e.g., EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 553 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 2009); cf.
EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp., 558 F.3d 842, 854 (9th Cir. 2008) (EEOC retained authority to
issue administrative subpoena even after it issued employee a right to sue letter and
employee had joined a class action against FedEx); but see EEOC v. Hearst Corp., 103 F.3d
462, 469–70 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that once the charging party receives a notice of right to
sue and files a lawsuit, the EEOC’s “time for investigation has passed”).
35 See, e.g., EEOC v. KECO Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 1097, 1100, 1102 (6th Cir. 1984) (find-
ing that sufficiency of the EEOC’s investigation was not reviewable in subsequent EEOC
litigation).
36 EEOC v. James Julian, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 59, 61 (D. Del. 1990) (“[A] court shall only
disallow a suit by the Commission if it is evident that the Commission failed to even under-
take an investigation.”).
37 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.14(a) (2013). The EEOC’s reasonable
cause determination (or no reasonable cause determination) is not evidence of discrimination
in any subsequent litigation. Gen. Elec. Co., 532 F.2d at 370 n.31 (“The Commission’s
determination does not establish rights or obligations; the [employer] is entitled to a trial de
novo in the district court.”). Accord Caterpillar, Inc., 409 F.3d at 833 (“The existence of
probable cause to sue is generally and in this instance not judicially reviewable.”); Georator
Corp. v. EEOC, 592 F.2d 765, 767 (4th Cir. 1979) (“[T]he court will not determine whether
substantial evidence supported the Commission’s preadjudication finding of reasonable
cause.”).
38 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
39 Charge Handling Process, supra note 27.
40 The statute sets forth penalties for disclosing information revealed during conciliation. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
41 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24(a).
42 Id.
43 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25 (notification in writing); 29
C.F.R. § 1601.27 (civil action by the EEOC).
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II. COURTS HAVE CONFLATED THE PURPOSE OF NOTICE IN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS WITH THE PURPOSE OF NOTICE IN LITIGATION
The EEOC’s efforts to conciliate charges of discrimination have been the
subject of much litigation in lawsuits filed by the EEOC in federal court.44
Defendants have argued that the EEOC’s failure to investigate or inadequate
efforts to conciliate deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction or form the
basis of an affirmative defense.45 Courts that have been presented with argu-
ments based on the EEOC’s administrative processing have come up with vari-
ous standards to review the sufficiency of the EEOC’s pre-suit conciliation
efforts.
Four different rules regarding the EEOC’s conciliation efforts have
emerged from federal courts. The Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and most of the courts
in the Ninth Circuit, look at whether the EEOC offered conciliation to the
employer and defer to the EEOC’s determination that conciliation has failed.46
The Eleventh and Fifth Circuits impose a searching inquiry on the EEOC’s
efforts during its conciliation and require the EEOC to “(1) outline to the
employer the reasonable cause for its belief that Title VII has been violated; (2)
offer an opportunity for voluntary compliance; and (3) respond in a reasonable
and flexible manner to the reasonable attitudes of the employer.”47 The Second
44 See, e.g., Serrano v. Cintas Corp., 699 F.3d 884, 904–05 (6th Cir. 2012); EEOC v. Agro
Distrib., LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 467–69 (5th Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co.,
340 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003); EEOC v. Delight Wholesale Co., 973 F.2d 664, 669
(8th Cir. 1992); EEOC v. St. Anne’s Hosp. of Chi., Inc., 664 F.2d 128, 131 (7th Cir. 1981);
EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1978); EEOC v. Evans Fruit Co., 872 F.
Supp. 2d 1107, 1112–13 (E.D. Wash. 2012); EEOC v. Timeless Invs., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d
1035, 1052–53 (E.D. Cal. 2010); EEOC v. Hometown Buffet, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1110,
1114 (S.D. Cal. 2007); EEOC v. Scolari Warehouse Mkts., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1129
(D. Nev. 2007); EEOC v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 209, 212 (N.D. Cal. 1982);
EEOC v. Canadian Indem. Co., 407 F. Supp. 1366, 1367 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
45 See, e.g., EEOC v. PBM Graphics Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 334, 348 (M.D. N.C. 2012)
(employer argued that the district court “lack[ed] jurisdiction to consider any allegations in
the complaint that were not also raised in the underlying administrative charge that led to the
EEOC’s investigation”); EEOC v. Riverview Animal Clinic, P.C., 761 F. Supp. 2d 1296,
1300 (N.D. Ala. 2010) (“Defendant’s second affirmative defense asserts that [the EEOC]
failed to satisfy the conditions precedent to instituting an action pursuant to Title VII. . . .
[T]his affirmative defense is based on [the EEOC’s] alleged failure to engage in the concilia-
tion process in good faith.”).
46 See, e.g., EEOC v. KECO Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 1097, 1102 (6th Cir. 1984); St. Anne’s
Hosp. of Chi., Inc., 664 F.2d at 131; Zia Co., 582 F.2d at 533 (conciliation efforts must be
made in good faith); Evans Fruit Co., 872 F. Supp. 2d at 1112–13; EEOC v. Global Hori-
zons, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1180 (D. Haw. 2012); Timeless Invs., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d
at 1052; Hometown Buffet, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 2d at 1114; Scolari Warehouse Mkts., Inc., 488
F. Supp. 2d at 1129. But see EEOC v. La Rana Hawaii, LLC, 888 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1046
(D. Haw. 2012) (staying the EEOC’s suit and ordering the EEOC to “redo” conciliation with
defendants because the EEOC had not given the defendants the “number or identity of
Claimants identified during its investigation, [and] specific instances of harassment or
discrimination”).
47 Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d at 1259. See also Agro Distrib., LLC, 555 F.3d at
468. The Eighth Circuit, as discussed below, has also adopted a searching inquiry of the
EEOC’s efforts despite its earlier decision in Delight Wholesale Co., that implied that the
court would give deference to the EEOC’s determination of its conciliation efforts. EEOC v.
CRST Van Expedited, Inc. 679 F.3d 657 (8th Cir. 2012).
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Circuit reviews the good faith efforts of the EEOC to engage in conciliation
unless the employer “refuses the invitation to conciliate or responds by denying
the EEOC’s allegations.”48 Finally, the Seventh Circuit has rejected the exis-
tence of an affirmative defense based on the EEOC’s administrative processing
of a charge of discrimination, and requires only that the EEOC “has pled on the
face of its complaint that it has complied with all procedures required under
Title VII and the relevant documents are facially sufficient.”49
With the exception of the Seventh Circuit,50 those courts that have
expressly considered the purposes behind the EEOC’s administrative process-
ing have stated that the EEOC’s pre-suit efforts provide the employer with
notice of the allegations.51 However, the courts do not draw distinctions
between the purposes of notice in the administrative processing and notice in
any lawsuit later initiated by the EEOC. In their decisions, courts have varied
about the amount of notice or disclosure required, but have been consistent in
framing the disclosure and notice obligations as flowing from the EEOC to the
employer. What the decisions demonstrate is that courts view the administra-
tive processing as an adjudicative arena in which employers have the same or
similar due process rights to notice of claims as they receive in litigation. As
discussed next, the cases range from requiring some level of notice that
describes generally the EEOC’s allegations, to explicitly making the suffi-
ciency of the EEOC’s notice in investigation and conciliation the same as the
notice required in subsequent litigation.
In Serrano v. Cintas, the district court found that the EEOC had failed to
comply with its conditions precedent to suit by not investigating or conciliating
its class-wide claims and it granted the Cintas’ motion for summary judg-
ment.52 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed.53 The Sixth Circuit confirmed its
precedent that “it is inappropriate for a ‘district court to inquire into the suffi-
ciency of the Commission’s investigation’ ” but at the same time stated “a
48 EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1535 (2d Cir. 1996).
49 EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 184 (7th Cir. 2013).
50 Id. The Seventh Circuit did not discuss or consider the purpose of notice in its decision.
In Mach Mining, the employer argued that the conciliation provision in Title VII created an
“implied affirmative defense” that allowed the employer to seek dismissal of the EEOC’s
lawsuit because it “failed to engage in good-faith conciliation before filing suit.” Id. at 172.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the argument and held that Title VII did not
create an affirmative defense based on failure to conciliate. Id. at 184. The court based its
finding on several reasons; first, it determined that court review of conciliation conflicted
with Title VII’s confidentiality provisions governing conciliation. Id. at 175. Second, it
determined that there was no workable standard to review the conciliation process. Id. at
178. Third, it found that review of the conciliation process would undermine the EEOC’s
conciliation efforts and that judicial review was unnecessary because the EEOC has “power-
ful incentives to conciliate.” Id. at 178–80 (noting that the agency is limited by its budget
and personnel resources, and that Congress and the executive can check the EEOC’s prac-
tices); see also Morrison, supra note 2 at 136–39 (2013) (discussing the EEOC’s political
accountability). Finally, the court noted that because the statute leaves the decision of
whether to accept an offer in conciliation to the EEOC, any review of conciliation would
have to be about the process not the substance, and so the remedy would be more process,
not dismissal. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d at 183–84.
51 See discussion of cases infra Part II.
52 Serrano v. Cintas Corp., 699 F.3d 884, 904 (6th Cir. 2012).
53 Id. at 905.
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district court should determine whether the EEOC made a good-faith effort to
conciliate the claims it now asserts, thereby providing the employer with ample
notice of the prospect of suit.”54 The court found that the EEOC had given the
company notice that it was investigating class-wide claims through its letter of
determination and by stating in its proposed conciliation agreement that it was
seeking “relief for ‘other similarly situated qualified female applicants.’ ”55
Thus, in Serrano, the Sixth Circuit determined that the EEOC was required to
provide notice of its claims during the administrative processing sufficient to
inform the employer about the scope of its claims and linked the notice to later
litigation.
The Eight Circuit also has found that the EEOC’s pre-suit notice to the
employer must include the scope of its claims but requires the EEOC to provide
notice regarding the size and make-up of its class of claimants. In EEOC v.
CRST Van Expedited, Inc., the Eighth Circuit upheld the dismissal of the
EEOC’s claim alleging that CRST had subjected a class of female employees to
a hostile work environment.56 During the lower court litigation, the district
court ordered the EEOC to make available for deposition any women in the
class for whom it sought relief.57 The EEOC identified two hundred and sev-
enty women and had made one hundred and fifty women available for deposi-
tions.58 Eventually, the court dismissed many of the women from the EEOC’s
suit—sixty-seven of them because it found the EEOC had not identified each
victim of the hostile work environment during the administrative processing
and conciliation.59 In making that determination, the court stated “[t]he Letter
of Determination did not provide CRST with any notice as to the size of the
‘class . . . and prospective employees [subjected] to sexual harassment.’ And,
during conciliation, the EEOC was unable ‘to provide [CRST] names of all
class members . . . , or an indication of the size of the class.’ ”60 In affirming
the district court’s decision, the Eighth Circuit adopted the district court’s rea-
soning.61 The court in EEOC v. La Rana Hawaii, LLC, also focused on
whether the EEOC disclosed enough information to “put Defendants on notice
of the class or its claims” during the EEOC’s administrative processing.62
54 Id. at 904 (quoting EEOC v. KECO Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 1097, 1100, 1102 (6th Cir.
1984) (emphasis added)).
55 Id. The Sixth Circuit also found that because the company “expressed no interest . . . in
reaching a settlement . . . ‘[t]he EEOC [was] under no duty to attempt further conciliation.’ ”
Id. at 904–05 (quoting KECO Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d at 1101–02).
56 EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657, 676–77 (8th Cir. 2012).
57 Id. at 670.
58 Id. at 669 n.3, 670.
59 Id. at 670–71. Besides not recognizing the inherent differences and purposes of notice in
the administrative processing of charges as opposed to the role of notice in litigation, the
decision does not take into account how class allegations normally work. Not even a private
class action under Rule 23(b)(3) must name each potential class member pre-certification or
even before a determination of liability on class claim, but instead is allowed to seek addi-
tional class members through discovery and through the post-judgment class notification
process.
60 Id. at 676 (quoting EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., No. 07-CV-95-LRR, 2009 WL
2524402 at *7, *8 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 13, 2009)) (emphasis added).
61 Id. at 676–77.
62 EEOC v. La Rana Hawaii, LLC, 888 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1045–46 (D. Haw. 2012).
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Other courts have explicitly referenced notice in their decisions about the
reviewability or adequacy of the EEOC’s investigation or conciliation. In
EEOC v. Swissport, the court focused on the notice provided to the employer
during the administrative processing, specifically using language in CRST to
incorporate the steps in the EEOC administrative processing as part of the
notice that a defendant is entitled to in any subsequent litigation. “The related-
ness of the initial charge, the EEOC’s investigation and conciliation efforts,
and the allegations in the complaint is necessary to provide the defendant-
employer adequate notice of the charges against it and a genuine opportunity to
resolve all charges through conciliation.”63 Similarly, in EEOC v. Bloomberg,
the district court explicitly linked the “notice” given in the administrative
processing to that in subsequent litigation, “ ‘[e]ven the most recalcitrant
employer . . . is due the process that Title VII mandates. Congress surely did
not intend that employers . . . face the moving target of allegedly aggrieved
persons that [the employer] faced in both the administrative and legal phases of
this dispute.’ ”64 In these decisions, the courts expressly have equated the
employer’s right to notice in the EEOC administrative processing to that in
subsequent litigation, and do not appear to draw a distinction between the two.
As outlined below, the “notice” in the EEOC’s administrative processing and
notice in civil actions are different, and conflating the two risks improperly
enlarging an employer’s due process rights and undermining the effective
enforcement of Title VII.
III. NOTICE IN EEOC ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSING IS NOT THE SAME AS
NOTICE IN A CIVIL ACTION
The purposes and treatment of notice in the context of litigation versus the
purpose of notice in the EEOC’s administrative processing demonstrate that the
two types of notice are not the same and courts should not treat them the same.
Ultimately, civil procedure seeks to ensure “accurate determinations of right,
reached through fair process, without delay, and freely available to every-
one.”65 To that end, notice of the claims becomes important in civil litigation.
The end result of civil proceedings conducted under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is a trial with a formal finding on liability. Thus, the stakes for the
parties are high.
In contrast, the main purpose of notice in the Commission’s administrative
handling of a charge is to provide the employer with the information it needs to
conduct its own investigation into whether it violated Title VII and to allow the
employer to preserve its records so it is not later forced to defend itself against
stale claims. In turn, that employers maintain their records and data assists the
63 EEOC v. Swissport Fueling, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1037 (D. Ariz. 2013) (quoting
EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657, 675 (8th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added)).
64 EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P., No. 07 Civ. 8383(LAP), 2013 WL 4799150 at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 9, 2013) (quoting EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., No. 07-CV-95-LRR, 2009 WL
2524402 at *18 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 13, 2009)).
65 James R. Maxeiner, Pleading and Access to Civil Procedure: Historical and Compara-
tive Reflections on Iqbal, A Day in Court and a Decision According to Law, 114 PENN. ST.
L. REV. 1257, 1260 (2010).
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EEOC in identifying discrimination, in particular, systemic discrimination
through its investigation. Moreover, the employer’s own investigation also
serves the purpose of encouraging the employer’s voluntary compliance with
Title VII. Finally, the end result of the EEOC’s administrative processing is
quite different from the end result in an adjudication. Any determination by the
EEOC regarding cause is not binding on the employer; it leads to an invitation
from the EEOC to voluntarily resolve the charge through informal conciliation.
A. Notice in Title VII Civil Actions—End Result Trial and Formal Finding
of Liability
The requirement that the complaint must include “a short and plain state-
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”66 is designed to
“ ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.’ ”67 Notice at the pleading stage not only serves to give
notice of the suit to the defendant but also serves a gatekeeping function meant
to protect the court and the defendant from embarking on a needless and expen-
sive discovery process.68 In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,69 the Court described the
gatekeeping function that requiring a well-pleaded complaints serves: “Rule 8
marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading
regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plain-
tiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”70 Both of these purposes, pro-
viding fair notice of the claims and ensuring that the plaintiff’s claim has a
basis in the law, bind the controversy thereby protecting “the autonomy of par-
ties and the privacy of the public.”71
Throughout discovery, disclosure regarding the factual basis of the claim
is an ongoing requirement for both parties either through initial disclosures
under Rule 26 or through the discovery mechanisms listed in Rules 27–37.72 In
drafting the discovery rules, Charles Clark believed that “[d]iscovery and sum-
mary judgment would allow for the rapid ‘disclosure of all facts and matters in
dispute, followed by prompt and final adjudication wherever that is feasible.’
66 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
67 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 335
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). For a discussion of whether the Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal
changed what is required to give a defendant in an employment discrimination suit “fair
notice” and the continuing viability of Swierkiewicz, see Professor Sullivan’s discussion in
Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination, supra note 2 at 1617–20, 1624–49.
68 Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 867 (2010); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Why Heightened
Pleading—Why Now?, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1247, 1251 (2010).
69 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
70 Id. at 678–79. This essay does not consider the challenges Iqbal may pose for plaintiffs
asserting claims under Title VII given the complexity of Title VII’s different proof structures
and the problem of proving discriminatory motive as to individual actors. However, Profes-
sor Charles Sullivan has discussed these challenges and offered some potential solutions.
Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1614.
71 Maxeiner, supra note 65, at 1267.
72 FED. R. CIV. P. 27–28, 30–31 (depositions); FED. R. CIV. P. 33 (interrogatories); FED. R.
CIV. P. 34 (requests for production or inspection); FED. R. CIV. P. 35 (examinations); FED. R.
CIV. P. 36 (requests for admission); FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (sanctions for failing to disclose).
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”
73
 The Court has stated that the purpose of the discovery rules is focused on
more precisely identifying the legal claims and avoiding surprise at trial:
The various instruments of discovery now serve (1) as a device . . . to narrow and
clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the
facts, or information as to the existence or whereabouts of facts, relative to those
issues. Thus civil trials in the federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark.
The way is now clear, consistent with recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain
the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.74
Thus, the disclosure obligations associated with discovery were designed with
an eye towards an adjudication of the parties’ claims.
Finally, notice to the defendant comes up again in class certifications
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and is focused on the employer’s
ability to defend itself in the suit, obtain individualized determinations of dam-
ages, and raise affirmative defenses. In General Telephone Co. of the Southwest
v. Falcon, the Court suggested that part of the reason Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(a) requires that the representative plaintiffs’ claims to be typical
of the class claims, is that it provides notice to employers regarding the types of
claims it will need to defend.75 The Court in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, reiterated this
concern through its emphasis on what it viewed as the common source of the
harm and indivisible nature of the remedy permitted in a Rule 23(b)(2) certified
class.76 If a Rule 23(b)(2) class seeks to remedy a harm that an employer took
towards the class as a whole, then it follows that the employer would have
actual knowledge of the pattern or practice and know how to defend itself in the
suit. However, if the class simply seeks to remedy several, individual harms,
then the employer would not necessarily be aware of the source of the harm for
each individual wrong, making the claims difficult to defend.77 As a result, the
Court was especially concerned with the impact that treating the class as a
whole would have on the employer’s entitlement to an individualized determi-
nation of each employee’s eligibility for backpay, to raise affirmative defenses
as to each employee’s claim, and to prove that its action was lawful as to each
73 Ronald J. Allen & Alan E. Guy, Conley as a Special Case of Twombly and Iqbal:
Exploring the Intersection of Evidence and Procedure and the Nature of Rules, 115 PENN.
ST. L. REV. 1, 8 (2010) (quoting Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 456
(1941)).
74 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
75 Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160–61 (1982) (“[W]ithout reasonable
specificity the court cannot define the class, cannot determine whether the representation is
adequate, and the employer does not know how to defend . . . .”) (quoting Johnson v. Ga.
Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1126 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold, J., concurring)).
76 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011). “The key to the (b)(2) class
is ‘the indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted—the notion that
the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class
members or as to none of them.” Id. (quoting Richard Nagareda, Class Certification in the
Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)).
77 Additionally, notice of the type of claims for which the class seeks certification serves not
only the defense of the current claim, but also ensures “that future employers have adequate
notice of which policies will pass muster under Title VII and which will not. If all class
actions settle, only relatively specific analysis of the merits at the certification stage can
provide this information.” Deborah M. Weiss, A Grudging Defense of Wal-Mart v. Dukes,
24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 119, 135 (2012).
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employee.78 In short, the notice concerns underlying the Court’s decision cen-
tered on what was at stake in the adjudication—a finding of liability that would
result in automatic imposition of damages for the defendant without the oppor-
tunity for the defendant to dispute the amount as to that particular class
member.
B. Notice in EEOC Administrative Processing—End Result Opportunity to
Voluntarily Comply with Title VII
As outlined above, notice to the employer comes up in the context of the
EEOC’s administrative processing of a charge in four areas: (1) notice to the
employer of the charge; (2) notice to the employer through the letter of deter-
mination regarding whether the EEOC found cause to believe the discrimina-
tion occurred; (3) notice to the employer that it has the opportunity to engage in
conciliation; and (4) notice that the conciliation has failed.79 Although the
EEOC is required to give notice of the charge to the employer through its
administrative processing, such notice does not serve the equivalent function as
a complaint filed in a lawsuit.80 Instead, the charge provides notice to the
EEOC that the charging party believes an employer has violated Title VII and
lets the EEOC know it must undertake an investigation.81 The purpose of the
notice of the charge to employers is to give “fair notice of the existence and
nature of the charges against them.”82 In some ways this tracks the purposes of
notice in litigation. However, the benefit notice provides to the EEOC broadens
that function of notice in administrative processing so that it also ensures that
the agency can fulfill its mandate to enforce Title VII.
This is further illustrated by two policies “latent” in Title VII that are also
served through notice of the charge to the employer.83 The first is a Congres-
sional desire that employers comply voluntarily, without resort to litigation,
with the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII.84 The second policy is to
encourage employers to “create and retain personnel records pertinent to their
treatment of [protected individuals].”85 This serves the needs of employers and
the EEOC. Employers need to gather records, in part, “in anticipation of a court
78 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S.Ct. at 2560–61.
79 See supra Part I and notes 16–17, 37–43.
80 EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68 (1984) (“[A] charge of employment discrimina-
tion is not the equivalent of a complaint initiating a lawsuit.”).
81 Id. In EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., the Seventh Circuit considered whether the
EEOC could bring a subpoena enforcement action after the charging party had settled, with
the settlement agreement contingent on his charge being withdrawn. EEOC v. Watkins
Motor Lines, Inc., 553 F.3d 593, 594–95 (7th Cir. 2009). The lower court treated the charge
“as if” it had been withdrawn and determined that the withdrawal deprived it of subject
matter jurisdiction over the enforcement action. Id. at 595. The Seventh Circuit reversed and
noted that the lower court may have been confused by what the Shell court meant by “juris-
diction.” Id. “The Justices appear to have meant the EEOC’s jurisdiction, not the court’s.”
Id.
82 Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 77.
83 Id.
84 Id. (noting, however, that the “hope proved overly optimistic, and the recalcitrance of
many employers compelled Congress in 1972 to strengthen the EEOC’s investigatory and
enforcement powers”).
85 Id. at 78.
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action” so that they are not forced to address “stale claims.”86 Preserving
records also serves the need of the EEOC “to make informed decisions at each
stage” of the administrative processing, i.e., the investigation, the cause deter-
mination, and conciliation.87 As a result, Title VII gave the EEOC “a broad
right of access to relevant evidence” during its investigation.88 Moreover, when
the EEOC seeks enforcement of an administrative subpoena during the investi-
gation, the court does not look at whether the charge is “well founded” or “veri-
fiable,” rather it determines whether the information the EEOC seeks through
the subpoena is “relevant” to the charge.89 Thus, the notice the EEOC provides
to the employer of the initial charge of discrimination serves as a starting point
for the EEOC’s investigation, lets the employer know to preserve records for
the EEOC’s investigation and for a potential lawsuit, and gives the employer
notice to conduct its own investigation into the allegations.
For example, in EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., the Supreme Court examined how
the charge, notice of the charge, and the EEOC’s investigative authority were
linked and what was required under the statute for each.90 The EEOC Chair
through a charge of discrimination alleged that Shell Oil Company had engaged
in a pattern or practice of discrimination against “[b]lacks and females on the
basis of race and sex with respect to recruitment, hiring, selection, job assign-
ment, training, testing, promotion, and terms and conditions of employment.”91
In the charge, the Chair also listed the location where the discrimination took
place, six occupational categories that were affected by the pattern or practice
based on race and seven that were affected by the pattern or practice based on
sex.92 As part of its investigation into the charge, the EEOC requested that the
company provide the EEOC with information from the company’s personnel
records.93 Shell Oil Company, in discussions with the EEOC, asserted that the
charge was not supported by facts, provided some employment statistics in an
attempt to demonstrate it had not engaged in discriminatory practices, and
requested that the EEOC withdraw the charge.94 The company did not provide
the information the EEOC had requested from the company’s files.95 The
EEOC then issued a subpoena for the records; Shell Oil Company did not com-
ply with the subpoena, and so the EEOC filed a subpoena enforcement action in
federal court.96
86 Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 372 (1977).
87 Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 191 (1990). The case was a subpoena enforcement
action in which the employer argued that the EEOC’s administrative subpoena was unen-
forceable because the information sought by the subpoena was protected either by privilege
or the First Amendment. Id. at 192.
88 Id. at 191.
89 Id.
90 Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 62–64.
91 Id. at 57.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 57–59.
95 Id. at 59.
96 Id. at 59–60.
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Shell Oil Company argued that the subpoena could not be enforced
because the charge did not state sufficient facts to support the charge.97 The
Supreme Court found that requiring the EEOC “to specify the persons discrimi-
nated against, the manner in which they were injured, and the dates on which
the injuries occurred . . . would radically limit the ability of the EEOC to inves-
tigate allegations of patterns and practices of discrimination.”98 The Court
determined that because the investigation must still be relevant to the charge,
that in a pattern or practice claim initiated by the EEOC, the Commissioner
should describe “the groups of persons” the EEOC believes were affected by
the pattern or practice, “the categories of employment positions” affected, “the
methods by which the discrimination may have been effected, and the periods
of time” in which the pattern or practice occurred.99 In Shell Oil Co., the Court
found that the Chair’s charge met those requirements.100
The Court also found that the EEOC’s notice of the charge to Shell Oil
Company served the purposes of the statute in three respects.101 It gave fair
notice to the employer about the allegations.102 By providing information about
“the areas and time periods” in which the EEOC alleged Shell Oil Company
had discriminated, the EEOC ensured that Shell Oil Company “if it [were] so
inclined” could conduct its own investigation into the allegations and volunta-
rily comply with Title VII.103 It also notified the company about the documents
that could be relevant to the investigation to guarantee that the company did not
accidentally destroy them.104 The Court also rejected Shell Oil Company’s con-
tention that Title VII required the EEOC to disclose to the company the statisti-
cal data on which the EEOC based its allegations because the statute provided
no support for that interpretation and such disclosure would not serve any of
the purposes of the notice requirement.105 The disclosure of that additional
information was not necessary to give Shell Oil Company fair notice of the
allegations: it would not further the goal of notifying the company that it
needed to identify and preserve relevant evidence and it would not assist Shell
Oil Company in voluntarily complying with Title VII.106 As to the latter point,
the Court noted that any “good-faith effort” on the part of a company to comply
with Title VII would require the company to initiate its own investigation into
the charge and “revelation of the evidence that precipitated the charge would
not relieve the employer of the duty to conduct such an inquiry.”107 This high-
lights another difference between notice in litigation and notice in the EEOC’s
administrative processing. In administrative processing, because of the focus on
voluntary compliance, the employer is not bound by the EEOC’s findings.
97 Id. at 60.
98 Id. at 70.
99 Id. at 73.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 79.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 79–80.
106 Id. at 80.
107 Id.
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The final step of the administrative processing, conciliation, relies on the
employer’s voluntary compliance. Unlike the final step in civil litigation—a
trial or adjudication on the merits in which a decision is imposed on the liti-
gants—both parties (the EEOC and the employer) enter into an agreement in
conciliation voluntarily.108 In the debates leading up to the passage of the 1972
Amendments, some legislators were concerned that the EEOC’s efforts to con-
ciliate were judicially unreviewable as written in the 1964 Act, and proposed
language that would allow defendants to challenge the conciliation process in
later litigation.109 Their concerns largely were based on a belief that employers,
through the conciliation process, were being “asked for more than the law
required.”110 In response to the proposal, Senator Javits argued that allowing
judicial review would ignore that conciliation is voluntary and he recognized
that making conciliation unreviewable does not abridge anyone’s rights:
I think the other critical point is that negotiations for settlement are traditionally
without prejudice. The . . . amendment would seek to make the negotiation of a
settlement a judicial proceeding, again an absolutely unheard of provision. No one’s
rights are cut off. The [employer] can appeal [the notice of conciliation failure within
the EEOC] . . . . Also, the party most affected—to wit, the basic party in interest—
the claimant, as it were—is not cut off from a suit that he is not a party to the
settlement of.111
The Senate rejected the proposed amendment.112 The history of the EEOC’s
conciliation and litigation authority make clear that a key difference between
administrative processing and litigation is the nature of the rights at stake.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has found that in subsequent litigation,
the EEOC’s claim is not limited to that of the charging parties in the charge of
discrimination.113 And, in subsequent litigation the court is not bound by the
EEOC’s finding of cause or no cause.114 Therefore, despite some similarities
between the purposes of notice in litigation and administrative processing, what
is at stake in each proceeding is decidedly different. Because an employer is not
bound by the EEOC’s findings in its charge processing and is not required to
conciliate, the notice provided to the employer during the administrative
processing does not have to be the equivalent of that provided in litigation
where an employer faces a finding that will subject it to liability.
IV. MISCONSTRUING NOTICE IN THE EEOC’S ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSING
IMPERMISSIBLY ENLARGES EMPLOYER’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AT THE
EXPENSE OF THE EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VII
Courts that fail to take account of the differences between notice and dis-
closure in litigation and notice and disclosure in the EEOC administrative
108 See 118 CONG. REC. 3,805 (Feb. 14, 1972) (statement of Sen. Javits) (“[T]here is no
compulsion on the [employer]—he does not have to enter into the conciliation agreement in
any way, shape or form . . . .”).
109 See id. at 3,803, 3,805.
110 Id. at 3805–06.
111 Id. at 3806–07.
112 Id. at 3807.
113 Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 331 (1980).
114 Id. at 332.
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processing, erroneously conflate the process that is due for employers in each
proceeding, run afoul of Congressional intent, and injure the effective enforce-
ment of Title VII. First, procedural rules in litigation “must be interpreted in
keeping with Article III constraints, and with the Rules Enabling Act, which
instructs that rules of procedure ‘shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any sub-
stantive right.’ ”115 Requiring notice and full disclosure during the EEOC
administrative processing and conciliation, both enlarges the employer’s sub-
stantive rights and abridges the employee’s right to redress.
The employer’s substantive right at issue during the EEOC administrative
processing is an opportunity to voluntarily resolve and comply with Title
VII.116 In rejecting the argument that the EEOC must meet the class certifica-
tion requirements under Rule 23 because otherwise defendants would be
deprived of the notice class certification provides, the Court in General Tele-
phone Company of the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC stated, “[t]he courts, however,
are not powerless to prevent undue hardship to the defendant . . . . The
employer may, by discovery and other pretrial proceedings, determine the
nature and the extent of the claims that the EEOC intends to pursue against
it.”117 Barring litigation of the EEOC’s conciliation efforts does not mean that
employers will be subjected to undue hardship. Employers still have the ability
through pleading and discovery to determine the scope of the claims and the
substance of the allegations against them prior to being subjected to trial.118
The process to challenge adequacy of notice in administrative processing,
then, is not through an affirmative defense or through a jurisdictional challenge
in subsequent EEOC litigation on the merits. Employers should challenge the
initial notice and the scope of the EEOC’s litigation during the administrative
processing—in response to the EEOC’s request for information and docu-
ments.119 Similarly, employers have the option of not conciliating if they
believe the EEOC’s claims are without merit and taking their chances that the
EEOC will not file a lawsuit in which the factual findings and the EEOC’s
115 Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072(b)).
116 See supra Part III.B (discussing an employer’s right to resolve an action through the
EEOC’s notice requirements).
117 Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc., 446 U.S. at 333.
118 For example, in EEOC v. Hotspur Resorts Nev., No. 2:10-cv-2265-RCJ-GWF, 2011 WL
4737409, at *1 (D. Nev. Oct. 5, 2011), the court granted the employer’s motion for a more
definite statement under Rule 12(e).
119 See, e.g., EEOC v. United Air Lines, Inc., 287 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2002). In United
Air Lines, the EEOC was investigating a charge of discrimination that alleged United Air
Lines had discriminated on the basis of national origin (American) and sex (female and
pregnancy) when the airline failed to pay into the French social security system on behalf of
the American employees, resulting in American employees “not [being] compensated for
absences from work due to illness or temporary disability whereas French employees are.”
Id. at 646. The EEOC issued an administrative subpoena to United Air Lines that sought
information not only related to American flight attendants in France and their French compa-
rators, but also sought information related to all of the airline’s employees residing abroad.
Id. at 654. United Air Lines objected to the subpoena and did not provide the information
requested, so the EEOC brought an enforcement action in federal court. Id. at 648. Although
the district court enforced the subpoena, the Seventh Circuit reversed because the subpoena
was overly broad and sought information not relevant to the initiating charge. Id. at 655.
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cause determination will be given no deference. Employers should not be able
to have it both ways; either the EEOC’s administrative processing is binding on
the employer and requires the type of due process rights that attach to binding
adjudications, or the EEOC’s administrative processing is not binding on the
employer and the court owes no deference to the EEOC’s factual findings in
subsequent litigation.
Second, Congress intended that the administrative processing of a charge
should not interfere with the right to redress violations of Title VII through
litigation. To ensure the effective enforcement of Title VII, Congress intention-
ally privileged the individual and the EEOC’s right to redress a violation of
Title VII over the EEOC’s role in the administrative processing of the charge.
In its Conference report on the 1972 Amendments, the Senate wrote:
It is hoped that recourse to the private lawsuit will be the exception and not the rule,
and that the vast majority of complaints will be handled through the offices of the
EEOC. . . . However, as the individual’s rights to redress are paramount under the
provisions of Title VII it is necessary that all avenues be left open for quick and
effective relief.120
This intent to ensure the right to redress is further illustrated by Congress’
passage of the Civil Rights Bill of 1991, in which Congress included compen-
satory and punitive damages within the potential remedies available under Title
VII.121 In expanding the remedies, Congress explicitly found that “additional
remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and inten-
tional discrimination in the workplace.”122 Rather than mandate that all com-
plaints be resolved administratively, Congress created a system in which
remedial rights are “paramount.”
The Court’s decision in the arbitration context illustrates the primacy of
remedial rights in the statutory scheme of federal anti-discrimination laws. In
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., the employer challenged the EEOC’s ability to
seek individual relief on behalf of an employee who had signed an arbitration
agreement.123 One of the reasons the Court rejected the employer’s arguments
was because it would “jeopardize the EEOC’s ability to investigate and select
cases from a broad sample of claims” given the increasing use of employment
arbitration clauses as a condition of employment.124
Finally, requiring the EEOC to provide the same notice to employers in its
administrative processing as it must in litigation will undermine the effective
enforcement of Title VII in concrete ways: it risks undermining the confidenti-
ality of conciliation; forcing the EEOC to reveal the identity of all claimants
may result in fewer people coming forward to report violations; and allowing
employers to litigate the sufficiency of notice in the administrative processing
needlessly introduces delays and inefficiencies in the litigation.
120 Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 366 (1977) (quoting 118 CONG.
REC. 7,168 (Mar. 6, 1972)).
121 See supra Part.I and note 14.
122 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071.
123 EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 291–92 (2002).
124 Id. at 296 n.11.
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Title VII and the EEOC’s regulations mandate that the EEOC maintain the
confidentiality of the conciliation.125 Making public anything “said or done
during and as a part of” conciliation will subject the person who reveals the
information to a fine of up to $1,000 and/or a term of imprisonment for up to
one year.126 The court in EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC discussed these confi-
dentiality provisions and concluded that Title VII “make[s] all details of the
conciliation process strictly confidential,” and thus allowing an affirmative
defense for failure to conciliate conflicts with the statute.127
In some cases, the EEOC may need to maintain the anonymity of potential
claimants and not doing so could deter victims of discrimination from coming
forward. For example, the nature of the allegations, the immigration status of
the claimants, or the risk of retaliation may justify anonymity. Indeed, the
Committee Conference Report for the 1972 Amendments states that one of the
reasons Congress amended the statute to allow the Commissioner to bring a
charge is it “would enable aggrieved persons to have charges processed under
circumstances where they are unwilling to come forward publicly for fear of
economic or physical reprisals.”128 Potential claimants may fear retaliation if
they are identified during conciliation as having provided information to the
EEOC during its investigation.129
That the EEOC received 31,208 charges of retaliation in its most recently
reported fiscal year, demonstrates that an employee’s fear of retaliation is not
baseless.130 Moreover, particularly vulnerable segments of the workforce may
fear retaliation because of their immigration status or the immigration status of
their family members:
Workers fear calling attention to themselves because they risk employer retaliation or
ICE detection. They will not want to make affirmative complaints regarding their
labor and employment conditions. Nor will they be willing to exercise their rights as
workers to enforce labor protections.131
In its most recent strategic plan, the EEOC reiterated its commitment to focus-
ing on cases in which discriminatory employment practices affect “vulnerable
125 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.26(a) (2013).
126 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
127 EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 174–75 (7th Cir. 2013).
128 118 CONG. REC. 7,167 (Mar. 6, 1972).
129 Cf. Morrison, supra note 2, at 143 (describing the ability of the EEOC to initiate an
investigation through a Commissioner’s Charge on behalf of an individual employee who
cannot file a Charge because he fears retaliation) (citing EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54,
62 (1984)).
130 Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2013, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMIS-
SION, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Apr. 8, 2014) (list-
ing data that shows the EEOC received 31,208 charges alleging retaliation under Title VII,
which makes up 31.4 percent of all charges the EEOC received in FY 2012).
131 Leticia M. Saucedo, Immigration Enforcement Versus Employment Law Enforcement:
The Case for Integrated Protections in the Immigrant Workplace, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
303, 310 (2010). See also Kati L. Griffith, Discovering “Immployment” Law: The Constitu-
tionality of Subfederal Immigration Regulation at Work, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389, 403
(2011) (discussing impact of state and local immigration regulation on the enforcement of
Title VII); Leticia M. Saucedo, A New “U”: Organizing Victims and Protecting Immigrant
Workers, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 891, 895 (2008).
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workers who may be unaware of their rights under the equal employment laws,
or reluctant or unable to exercise them.”132
Employer challenges to the EEOC administrative process also result in
delays and inefficiencies in subsequent litigation. The Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that some employers may “have no interest in complying voluntarily
with the Act, [and] wish instead to delay as long as possible investigations by
the EEOC.”133 The same could be said of litigation. Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 1 states: “[the rules shall] be construed and administered to secure the
just, speedy, and, inexpensive determination of every action.” Requiring that
notice and disclosure of information during the EEOC’s administrative process-
ing of charges be the equivalent of the notice and disclosure given to defend-
ants during litigation does not result in the “speedy, and, inexpensive
determination” of Title VII claims. Court time is expended in making a deter-
mination under such an approach. In each case, courts would have to examine
the merits as determined in the administrative processing. Such a subjective test
requires a fact intensive inquiry that would also waste court resources. For
instance, in EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, the court described the two years of
litigation that occurred relating to whether the EEOC had conciliated in good
faith:
The parties have spent nearly two years sparring over whether [the failure to concili-
ate in good faith] is a sufficient ground for dismissing the discrimination case. [It]
has been the subject of extensive discovery requests by Mach Mining seeking infor-
mation about the EEOC’s investigation and conciliation efforts. The defense has also
slowed discovery on the merits of the underlying discriminatory hiring claim. Mach
Mining has asserted failure to conciliate as a basis for objecting to a number of the
EEOC’s discovery requests.134
This type of litigation is neither speedy nor inexpensive, and “impose[s] signifi-
cant costs on both sides, as well as on the court.”135
Moreover, once the court finds that the employer received proper notice
and the EEOC disclosed the relevant information, the inquiry into the merits of
the claim will begin. Allowing collateral inquiry into the EEOC’s administra-
tive processing of charges is not consistent with Rule 1’s mandate that court
procedure be administered in a just manner. Without a bright line rule or gov-
erning set of principles, courts may reach inconsistent determinations regarding
when notice is sufficient and whether the EEOC’s disclosure of information
during conciliation was consistent with “good faith” efforts. As the current cir-
cuit split demonstrates, this result is already occurring.136
132 U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT PLAN FY
2013–2016, at 1 (2012), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/sep.cfm.
133 Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 194 (1990) (quoting EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466
U.S. 54, 81 (1984)).
134 EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 173 (7th Cir. 2013).
135 Id. at 179.
136 Id. at 183 (“Given Title VII’s deliberate silence concerning the details of conciliation, it
is not surprising that other courts have struggled to provide meaningful guidance on how to
judge the process.”). See also id. at 176 n.2 (providing a compilation of cases illustrating the
inconsistencies in the decisions reached by courts about the proper scope of review of
conciliation).
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CONCLUSION
This essay argues that courts have not looked carefully at the purposes of
notice in determining a governing set of principles for collateral attacks on the
EEOC’s administrative processing. Instead, courts have misconstrued notice in
the charge handling procedures by conflating it with the purposes of notice in
litigation. This view fails to take account of the important differences between
the two, most importantly, what is at stake for employers in each proceeding.
As a result, courts are doing real harm to the EEOC’s ability to effectively
enforce Title VII.
